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When Celebrities Get What They Want . . .

Have you seen Kanye West’s latest sculpture? If not, it’s from his new music video entitled Famous

Have you seen Kanye West’s latest sculpture? If not, it’s from his new music video entitled Famous
(h栀挀ps://www.google.com/imgres?
imgurl=h栀挀p%3A%2F%2Fhypebeast.com%2Fimage%2F2016%2F07%2Fkanye‑west‑famous‑video‑
100.jpg&imgrefurl=h栀挀p%3A%2F%2Fhypebeast.com%2F2016%2F8%2Fkanye‑west‑famous‑sculpture‑
exhibit&docid=vq9NrXMk_uR_wM&tbnid=4qBnu4YYk9aR1M%3A&w=1437&h=958&bih=619&biw=1280&
ved=0ahUKEwiwrPvP9IDPAhVUHGMKHV5wC5wQMwgfKAEwAQ&iact=mrc&uact=8) and is now on
exhibition at the Los Angeles’ Blum & Poe gallery. The sculpture, created from wax, is the realistic, nude
likeness of: George W. Bush, Anna Wintour, Donald Trump, Rihanna, Chris Brown, Taylor Swift, Kanye
West, Kim Kardashian, Ray J, Amber Rose, Caitlyn Jenner, and Bill Cosby. Understandably, after the video
was released on June 24, 2016 it caused quite the controversy. Kanye even tweeted
(h栀挀ps://www.accesshollywood.com/articles/kanye‑west‑tweets‑can‑somebody‑sue‑me‑already‑day‑after‑
releasing‑his‑famous‑video/), “Can somebody sue me already #i’llwait.” But while it seems unlikely that
anyone will sue, the question posed here is—if they did, could they win? The answer: probably not
(h栀挀p://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7423175/kanye‑west‑famous‑legal‑analysis).
When a celebrity a栀挀empts to control the exploitation of their name, likeness, and fame, this falls under a
claim of misappropriation. Some states have adopted the action under a separate common law remedy,
however, most have developed it as an oﬀshoot of the common law right of privacy. Restatement of the
Law, Second, Torts § 652(c) (“one who appropriates to his own use or beneﬁt the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”). Under Cal. Civ. Code § 3344
(h栀挀p://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi‑bin/displaycode?section=civ&group=03001‑04000&ﬁle=3344‑3346), the
person’s likeness has to be pre栀挀y detailed and “readily identiﬁable.” The likeness must also be used for
commercial purposes.
For example, Vanna White lost a claim of misappropriation under the California statute, but won under the
common law when a Samsung commercial (h栀挀p://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/robot‑vanna‑trashy‑
presidents‑and‑steak‑as‑health‑food‑samsung‑sells‑tomorrow‑22348926/?no‑ist) contained a robot with her
likeness. Thus, a claim for misappropriation under the common law is much broader than in California.
For instance, “likeness” could encompass not only a picture of you, but also other items that would make
one think of you. And, this “likeness” could be used for both commercial purposes or for non‑commercial
purposes (such as impersonating someone to induce others to disclose conﬁdential information).
But, when the value of a work of art comes principally from some source other than the fame of the
celebrity, this is not misappropriation. In the iconic case Winter v. D.C. Comics
(h栀挀p://www.leagle.com/decision/2003768134CalRptr2d634_1704/WINTER%20v.%20DC%20COMICS), the
Winter Brothers (h栀挀ps://selvedgeyard.com/2010/04/13/winter‑whites‑johnny‑edgar‑legendary‑winter‑
brothers/) ﬁled suit against DC Comics for misappropriation of their likeness. In the comic series, the
“Autumn Brothers (h栀挀p://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Celebrities‑image‑rights‑vs‑First‑Amendment‑
2648361.php),” half‑worm‑half‑humans are killed by an anti‑hero. However, the court found that the value
of the work contained suﬃciently transformative elements to warrant First Amendment protection. The
“inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is
synthesized or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is in sum and substance of the work in
question (h栀挀p://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/winter‑v‑dc‑comics‑33304).”
In other words, the question becomes whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed
that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. Here,
Kanye’s sculpture has enough transformative elements to be protected under the First Amendment
(h栀挀ps://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/ﬁrst_amendment). While it is clear that the nude ﬁgures are
indeed the celebrities identiﬁed above, Kanye is using them to personify “fame” and what it means to be
“famous.” And, the idea of a boudoir including all of the nude celebrities is, indeed, fanciful.

And When They Don’t . . .
In case you don’t remember, “Left Shark” made its appearance at Super Bowl XLIX
(h栀挀ps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmcWZ2Bzoho). But few thought about who owned the rights to the
costume of this infamous back‑up dancer. Left Shark was one of Katy Perry’s costumed half‑time dancers,
who became an internet sensation for dancing slightly oﬀ beat. However, after Perry’s legal team sent Etsy‑
based 3D‑printer, Fernando Sosa (h栀挀p://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/artist‑ﬁght‑katy‑
perry‑sell‑shark‑toys‑article‑1.2109843), a cease and desist le栀挀er, the question arose—can Katy Perry
copyright Left Shark? The answer: most likely no
(h栀挀ps://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150211/12073529990/cant‑make‑this‑up‑katy‑perrys‑lawyers‑use‑left‑
shark‑photo‑taken‑guy‑theyre‑threatening‑trademark‑application.shtml).
The extent that clothing is copyrightable is a question that lawyers as well as judges still grapple with
today. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution (h栀挀ps://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei)
states that Congress has the power to “promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”
Therefore, cultivating creativity is the general concept behind copyright law. Copyright law exists to
balance the creator’s entitlement to compensation, and the public’s desire to beneﬁt from creations. This
balance means giving the creators enough rights to have an incentive to create, and the public the beneﬁts
of advancing technology and culture.
Courts have concluded that clothing is non‑copyrightable because it serves a utilitarian purpose. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (h栀挀p://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#101) deﬁnes “useful article” as one having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is also considered a useful article. For
example, even Halloween costumes are seen as utilitarian and thus, in the eyes of the law, are not
copyrightable.
While this may seem strange in light of fashion weeks ﬁlled with grand designs from Chanel to Valentino,
there are, understandably, exceptions to § 101’s general rule. In the quintessential case Brandir International,
Inc. v. Cascade Paciﬁc Lumber Co (h栀挀ps://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/4621)., the court held that “if design
elements reﬂect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be
said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements.” Contrariwise, when design elements are
identiﬁable because they reﬂect the designer’s “artistic judgment,” they may be seen independently of
functional inﬂuences, and thus conceptual separability
(h栀挀p://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=lawreview) exists. When
features can be identiﬁed separately and are capable of existing independently from the utilitarian aspects
of clothing, those items may be protected by copyright.
Courts often rely on the Denicola Test
(h栀挀p://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/upload_documents/Brandir%20Intl%20v.%20Cascade%20Pac%
20Lumber%20Co_0.pdf), which highlights whether the designer was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by functional
considerations. In writing for Brandir, Judge Oakes (h栀挀p://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/10/16/law‑blog‑
obituary‑second‑circuit‑judge‑james‑oakes/) stated, “copyrightability ultimately should depend on the
extent to which the work reﬂects artistic expression uninhibited by functional considerations.” But, what
constitutes “artistic expression” is disputed. For example, in Kieselstein‑Cord v. Accessories by Pearl Inc.,
(h栀挀p://coolcopyright.com/application/ﬁles/9514/3983/4331/3e_Kielstein‑Cord.pdf) the central issue was
whether a designer belt buckle was copyrightable. Under the Denicola Test, the court had to decide

whether a designer belt buckle was copyrightable. Under the Denicola Test, the court had to decide
whether a designer belt buckle had a visual function that was not tied directly to its utilitarian function of
holding a belt together. The court held that the buckles (h栀挀p://coolcopyright.com/contents/chapter‑
4/kieselstein‑cord‑v‑accessories‑pearl) were “sculptured designs cast in precious metals – decorative in
nature and used as jewelry is, principally for ornamentation.” Therefore, the buckles were separate enough
to be protected by copyright, although belts in general receive no such protection.
Costumes, on the other hand, are their own entity in the land of copyright, with protection that is diﬀerent
from that of general clothing. Costumes present diﬀerent copyright issues because they are not only
function as apparel that covers the body, but they can also be decorative and whimsical
(h栀挀p://www.newmediarights.org/business_models/artist/can_you_copyright_clothing_designs). Therefore,
the question for costumes is where to draw the lines in copyright law. While copyright law does not allow
for protection of useful articles, this does not mean that costumes are left without any copyright protection
at all.
Copyright law explicitly does not allow for useful articles to be eligible for copyright protection. In
deﬁning “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural” works, the Copyright Act
(h栀挀ps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/101) states that:
[s]uch works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as deﬁned in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identiﬁed separately from, and are capable of existing independently
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.

But, courts have concluded that some elements of clothing, and therefore costumes, are indeed eligible for
copyright protection. Elements that are works of art, ﬁ栀挀ing into the pictorial, graphic and sculptural
category, are eligible for copyright protection. For example, Kieselstein‑Cord’s ornamental belt‑buckle was
found to be conceptually separate from its utilitarian function. Likewise, for costumes
(h栀挀p://www.copyright.gov/history/mls/ML‑435.pdf), this has come to mean that masks, headpieces and
tails are generally suitable subjects for copyright.
Here, the costume of Left Shark may be seen as solely utilitarian. Its design is not separate from its

Here, the costume of Left Shark may be seen as solely utilitarian. Its design is not separate from its
function, regardless of whether Perry’s team of a栀挀orneys believes there are “separable” components.
Moreover, it takes a stretch to conceive what these separable components would be. The ﬁns, the eyes, the
tail? This costume takes every feature for it to equate to a shark, which indeed is what this costume is. As a
generic shark costume, it contains no whimsical or decorative additions. Unfortunately for Perry
(h栀挀p://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr‑esq/katy‑perrys‑left‑shark‑design‑790542), it looks as though the
Left Shark is a costume that will be enjoyed, replicated, and worn by the masses.
In sum, whether it be a nude sculpture or a shark costume, there will always be questions regarding celebrities, art and
the law.
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